David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659 (2004)
The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations. And in people without disorders, phenomena such as hypnosis, automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance channeling also illustrate anomalies of will – cases when actions occur without will or will occurs without action. This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself – not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced. Key Words: apparent mental causation; automatism; conscious will; determinism; free will; perceived control.
|Keywords||apparent mental causation automatism conscious will determinism free will perceived control|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
Friederike Schüür & Patrick Haggard (2011). What Are Self-Generated Actions? Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1697-1704.
Sarah K. Paul (2015). The Transparency of Intention. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1529-1548.
Thor Grünbaum (2015). The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique. Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337.
S. JoneS, L. Dewit, C. Fernyhough & E. MEins (2008). A New Spin on the Wheel of Fortune: Priming of Action-Authorship Judgements and Relation to Psychosis-Like Experiences. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):576-586.
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