David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69 (2003)
We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reﬂect direct perceptions of conscious thought causing action
|Keywords||*Conscious (Personality Factor) *Consciousness States *Volition|
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Citations of this work BETA
Glenn Carruthers (2010). A Problem for Wegner and Colleagues' Model of the Sense of Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.
Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale (2011). Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385 - 407.
Gerben Meynen (2010). Wegner on Hallucinations, Inconsistency, and the Illusion of Free Will. Some Critical Remarks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):359-372.
Alfred Mele (2013). Unconscious Decisions and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):777-789.
Monima Chadha (2009). An Independent, Empirical Route to Nonconceptual Content. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):439-448.
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