David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69 (2003)
We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reﬂect direct perceptions of conscious thought causing action
|Keywords||*Conscious (Personality Factor) *Consciousness States *Volition|
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Citations of this work BETA
M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi (2012). Intentional Binding and the Sense of Agency: A Review. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):546-561.
James W. Moore & P. C. Fletcher (2012). Sense of Agency in Health and Disease: A Review of Cue Integration Approaches. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):59-68.
Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
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