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Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):607-630 (2004)
The purpose of the present paper is to challenge some received assumptions about the logical analysis of modal English, and to show that these assumptions are crucial to certain debates in current philosophy of language. Specifically, I will argue that the standard analysis in terms of quantified modal logic mistakenly fudges important grammatical distinctions, and that the validity of Kripke's modal argument against description theories of proper names crucially depends on ensuing equivocations
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046193.69391.18
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Stephen Yablo (2002). Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 441-492.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jordan Stein (2013). How Many Notions of Necessity? Philosophical Studies 165 (2):605-627.
Rohan French (2012). An Argument Against General Validity? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):4-9.

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