David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562 (2002)
The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive modularity also lacks some of the invidious commitments Fodor ascribes to it. Furthermore, Fodor's anti-adaptationist arguments are in tension with his nativism about the contents of modular systems. The New Synthesis thus has points worth preserving.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (eds.) (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
G. Segal, P. Carruthers & K. Smith (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press
Richard Samuels (1998). Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
Citations of this work BETA
Willem E. Frankenhuis & Annemie Ploeger (2007). Evolutionary Psychology Versus Fodor: Arguments for and Against the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):687 – 710.
Eric Mandelbaum (2014). The Automatic and the Ballistic: Modularity Beyond Perceptual Processes. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1147-1156.
Similar books and articles
Andre Ariew (2003). Natural Selection Doesn't Work That Way: Jerry Fodor Vs. Evolutionary Psychology on Gradualism and Saltationism. Mind and Language 18 (5):478-483.
S. Okasha (2003). Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
John Sutton (2001). Review of Jerry Fodor, the Mind DoesnT Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 5 (7).
John M. Collins (2005). On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity. Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
Susan Schneider (2007). Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Psyche.
Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press 407-425.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads76 ( #55,323 of 1,796,218 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #116,661 of 1,796,218 )
How can I increase my downloads?