Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content

Abstract
Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,817
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
L. W. Barsalou (1983). Ad Hoc Categories. Memory and Cognition 11:211-277.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

View all 34 references

Citations of this work BETA
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). First Thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):251 – 268.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2010). The Theoretical Indispensability of Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):228 - 229.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

74 ( #20,155 of 1,099,909 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

14 ( #15,728 of 1,099,909 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.