Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content

Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepls are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00269.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). The Origins of Concepts. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):359 - 384.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2010). The Theoretical Indispensability of Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):228 - 229.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2007). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Hemdat Lerman (2010). Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

35 ( #93,308 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #118,705 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.