Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163 (2009)
|Abstract||Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepls are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2007). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Gregory McCulloch (2001). Mental Representation and Mental Presentation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Jack M. C. Kwong (2007). Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
Louise Anthony (1993). Conceptual Connection and the Observation/ Theory Distinction. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
A. Levine & Mark H. Bickhard (1999). Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):5-23.
John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). Some Arguments Against Intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.
Simone Gozzano (2008). In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Hemdat Lerman (2010). Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.
Jacob Beck (2012). The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought. Mind 121 (483):563-600.
Nathaniel Goldberg (2004). E Pluribus Unum: Arguments Against Conceptual Schemes and Empirical Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):411-438.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads11 ( #107,691 of 753,454 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,000 of 753,454 )
How can I increase my downloads?