David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 105 (420):577-602 (1996)
Antirealism about the past is apparently in conflict with our acceptance of a set of systematic linkages between the truth-values of differently tensed sentences made at different times. Arguments based on acceptance of these so-called truth-value links seem to show that fully accounting for our use of the past and future tenses will involve use of a notion of truth which is not epistemically constrained and is thus antirealistically unacceptable. I elaborate these difficulties through an examination of work by Dummett and Wright. I agree with Wright's rejection of Dummett's proposal but go on to argue that Wright's account fares no better. Building on what I take to be the failure of Wright's account, I offer a solution for the antirealist which diagnoses the problem as stemming from an equivocation in the meanings assigned to the tensed truth predicates. I close by raising a different problem for antirealist accounts of the past, one which is, however, related to more general difficulties for antirealist theories of meaning
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2010). Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
WR Stirton (1997). Anti-Realism, Truth-Conditions and Verificationism. Mind 106 (424):697-716.
Richard Swinburne (1990). Tensed Facts. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (2):117 - 130.
Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
Neil Tennant (1987). Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal. Oxford University Press.
Christine Tappolet (1997). Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Analysis 57 (3):209–210.
A. Paya (1995). Philosophers Against “Truth”: The Cases of Harr and Laudan. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):255 – 284.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads106 ( #40,138 of 1,938,465 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #45,406 of 1,938,465 )
How can I increase my downloads?