Graduate studies at Western
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (2):105-128 (2004)
|Abstract||In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense-datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.|
|Keywords||Epistemology Externalism Perception Realism Representation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Wolterstorff (2006). What Sort of Epistemological Realist Was Thomas Reid? Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):111-124.
Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija (2004). Some Epistemological Consequences of The Dual-Aspect Theory of Visual Perception. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):273-290.
David Kelley (1986). The Evidence Of The Senses: A Realist Theory Of Perception. Baton Rouge: Louisiana St University Press.
N. M. L. Nathan (2005). Direct Realism: Proximate Causation and the Missing Object. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):3-6.
David H. Sanford (1976). The Primary Objects of Perception. Mind 85 (April):189-208.
Howard M. Robinson (1994). Perception. New York: Routledge.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). A Limited Defense of Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
John Dilworth (2004). Naturalized Perception Without Information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #19,833 of 740,104 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #13,459 of 740,104 )
How can I increase my downloads?