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An ultra-realist theory of perception

In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense-datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.
Keywords Epistemology  Externalism  Perception  Realism  Representation
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Kenneth Hobson (2013). In Defense of Relational Direct Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.
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