Belief and acceptance

In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp. 499--520 (2004)
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Abstract

The attitudes of belief and acceptance are similar but differ in important respects such as their relation to degree of belief.

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
Is the Precautionary Principle a Midlevel Principle?Per Sandin & Martin Peterson - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1):34-48.
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.

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