In Henk de Regt, Stephen Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 415–425 (2012)
Abner Shimony (1988) argues that degrees of belief satisfy the axioms of probability because their epistemic goal is to match estimates of objective probabilities. Because the estimates obey the axioms of probability, degrees of belief must also obey them to reach their epistemic goal. This calibration argument meets some objections, but with a few revisions it can surmount those objections. It offers a good alternative to the Dutch book argument for compliance with the probability axioms. The defense of Shimony's calibration argument examines rational pursuit of an epistemic goal, introduces strength of evidence and its measurement, and distinguishes epistemic goals and functions.
Keywords probability  probabilism
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