David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 16:369-385 (1991)
Classical bargaining theory attempts to solve a bargaining problem using only the information about the problem contained in the representation of its possible outcomes in utility space. However, this information usually underdetermines the solution. I use additional information about interpersonal comparisons of utility and bargaining power. The solution is then the outcome that maximizes the sum of power-weighted utilities. I use these results to advance a contractarian argument for a utilitarian form of social cooperation. As the original position, I propose a hypothetical situation in which the members of society are rational, fully informed, free, and equal. I argue that in this original position they would adopt a utilitarian form of social cooperation. I conclude that utilitarian cooperation constitutes a moral ideal toward which society ought to aspire
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Moehler (2010). The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice. Utilitas 22 (4):447-473.
Andreas Pfingsten & Andreas Wagener (2003). Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises. Theory and Decision 55 (4):359-389.
Edward McClennen (2012). Rational Cooperation. Synthese 187 (1):65-93.
Vincenzo Denicolò & Marco Mariotti (2000). Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings. Theory and Decision 48 (4):351-358.
Joachim Rosenmüller (1997). Bargaining with Incomplete Information an Axiomatic Approach. Theory and Decision 42 (2):105-146.
Jonathan Shalev (2002). Loss Aversion and Bargaining. Theory and Decision 52 (3):201-232.
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch (1999). Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality. Theory and Decision 47 (2):111-138.
Mohammed Dore (1997). On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract. Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.
John Thrasher (2014). Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):683-699.
Daniel Cardona-Coll (2003). Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment. Theory and Decision 54 (4):357-374.
Luca Ferrero (2005). The Will: Interpersonal Bargaining Versus Intrapersonal Prediction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):654-655.
Michael Byron (1995). Rationality Is Not Fair. Analysis 55 (4):252 - 260.
Maarten Cornet (2000). Externalities in a Bargaining Model of Public Price Announcements and Resale. Theory and Decision 49 (4):375-393.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads19 ( #147,771 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #74,830 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?