Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor

Synthese 160 (2):161-181 (2008)
The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
Keywords Consciousness  Same-order representation  Higher-order representation  Misrepresentation  Qualia
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9106-0
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,675
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Josh Weisberg (2011). Misrepresenting Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
Sam Coleman (2015). Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

110 ( #38,323 of 2,255,076 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

22 ( #22,115 of 2,255,076 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.