Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor
Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 160 (2):161-181 (2008)
|Abstract||The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy.|
|Keywords||Consciousness Same-order representation Higher-order representation Misrepresentation Qualia|
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