Graduate studies at Western
Psyche 12 (1) (2006)
|Abstract||ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's theory in relation to other naturalistic theories of|
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Phenomenology *Self Perception Subjectivity Theories|
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