Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-97 (2007)
|Abstract||Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. There are ways to connect Conditionalization to Reflection, but these connections depend on poor assumptions about our introspective access, and are not tight enough to draw the sorts of conclusions van Fraassen wants. Upon close examination, the two principles seem to be getting at two quite independent epistemic norms.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Weisberg (2009). Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793 - 812.
Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani (2013). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
Hilary Greaves & David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Bas C. van Fraassen (1999). Conditionalization, a New Argument For. Topoi 18 (2):93-96.
Patrick Maher (1992). Diachronic Rationality. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
Matthias Hild (1998). The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization. Synthese 115 (2):229-258.
Rachael Briggs (2009). Distorted Reflection. Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads54 ( #18,756 of 548,970 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,438 of 548,970 )
How can I increase my downloads?