Distance, anger, freedom: An account of the role of abstraction in compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions

Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):803 - 823 (2011)
Abstract
Experimental philosophers have disagreed about whether "the folk" are intuitively incompatibilists or compatibilists, and they have disagreed about the role of abstraction in generating such intuitions. New experimental evidence using Construal Level Theory is presented. The experiments support the views that the folk are intuitively both incompatibilists and compatibilists, and that abstract mental representations do shift intuitions, but not in a univocal way.
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Double (1994). How to Frame the Free Will Problem. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):149-72.

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