David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 83 (1):159 - 177 (1990)
In this paper, I examine the possibility of accounting for the rationality of belief-formation by utilising decision-theoretic considerations. I consider the utilities to be used by such an approach, propose to employ verisimilitude as a measure of cognitive utility, and suggest a natural way of generalising any measure of verisimilitude defined on propositions to partial belief-systems, a generalisation which may enable us to incorporate Popper's insightful notion of verisimilitude within a Bayesian framework. I examine a dilemma generated by the decision-theoretic procedure and consider an adequacy condition (immodesty) designed to ameliorate one of its horns. Finally, I argue in a sceptical vein that no adequate verisimilitude measure can be used decision-theoretically.
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1952). The Continuum of Inductive Methods. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Isaac Levi (1967/1973). Gambling with Truth. Cambridge,Mit Press.
David Lewis (1971). Immodest Inductive Methods. Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
David Miller (1974). Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.
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