David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 83 (1):159 - 177 (1990)
In this paper, I examine the possibility of accounting for the rationality of belief-formation by utilising decision-theoretic considerations. I consider the utilities to be used by such an approach, propose to employ verisimilitude as a measure of cognitive utility, and suggest a natural way of generalising any measure of verisimilitude defined on propositions to partial belief-systems, a generalisation which may enable us to incorporate Popper's insightful notion of verisimilitude within a Bayesian framework. I examine a dilemma generated by the decision-theoretic procedure and consider an adequacy condition (immodesty) designed to ameliorate one of its horns. Finally, I argue in a sceptical vein that no adequate verisimilitude measure can be used decision-theoretically.
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Karl R. Popper (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Isaac Levi (1967). Gambling with Truth. Cambridge,MIT Press.
Ian Hacking (1976). Logic of Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1952). The Continuum of Inductive Methods. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla (1992). Truthlikeness Without Truth: A Methodological Approach. Synthese 93 (3):343-372.
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