David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43 (2012)
Philosophers who theorize about whether free will is compatible with causal determinism often rely on ordinary intuitions to bolster their theory. A revisionist theory of free will takes a different approach, saying that the best philosophical theory of what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we ordinarily do think about free will. I contend that revisionism has not been taken as seriously as should be because philosophers have not realized the extent to which ordinary intuitions are inconsistent. I present an experiment that gives empirical evidence for revisionism. The experiment shows that, in spite of the fact that the ?is compatible with? relation is symmetric, folk intuitions change as a function of whether we ask ?Is determinism compatible with free will?? versus ?Is free will compatible with determinism?? The paper explores possible explanations for why folk intuitions do not mirror the symmetry of the ?is compatible with? relation, but regardless of which of these explanations is correct, I argue that we must be revisionists in at least this sense: what we ought to believe about free will cannot include everything we do believe about free will
|Keywords||free will revisionism experimental philosophy psychological distance construal level theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Saul Smilansky (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press.
Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2008). Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
Chris Weigel (2011). Distance, Anger, Freedom: An Account of the Role of Abstraction in Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):803 - 823.
Citations of this work BETA
James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
Florian Cova (2014). Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.
Adam Feltz (2015). Experimental Philosophy of Actual and Counterfactual Free Will Intuitions. Consciousness and Cognition 36:113-130.
Similar books and articles
Manuel Vargas (2005). The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.
Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray (2010). Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan 189--215.
Manuel Vargas (2011). Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges. In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford UP
Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave
Manuel Vargas (2013). How to Solve the Problem of Free Will. In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. OUP Usa 400.
Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Tamler Sommers (2010). Experimental Philosophy and Free Will. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Manuel Vargas (2009). Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement & Defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45 - 62.
Manuel Vargas (2009). Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement and Defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.
Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Folk Fears About Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism Vs. Reductionism. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.
John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..
Shaun Nichols (2006). Folk Intuitions on Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:57-86.
Added to index2012-06-16
Total downloads58 ( #71,530 of 1,792,272 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #119,978 of 1,792,272 )
How can I increase my downloads?