Philosophy of Science 51 (1):150-155 (1984)
|Abstract||Recently, Michael Redhead has argued that the grouping of particles into multiplets by grand unified gauge theories (GUT's) does not, by itself, imply an ontological reduction in the number of elementary particles. While sympathetic to Redhead's argument, in this note I argue that under certain conditions involving Kaluza-Klein theories, GUT's would provide such an ontological reduction|
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