How causal probabilities might fit into our objectively indeterministic world

Synthese 149 (1):1--36 (2006)
We suggest a rigorous theory of how objective single-case transition probabilities fit into our world. The theory combines indeterminism and relativity in the “branching space–times” pattern, and relies on the existing theory of causae causantes (originating causes). Its fundamental suggestion is that (at least in simple cases) the probabilities of all transitions can be computed from the basic probabilities attributed individually to their originating causes. The theory explains when and how one can reasonably infer from the probabilities of one “chance set-up” to the probabilities of another such set-up that is located far away.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118722
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Müller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487 - 520.

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Citations of this work BETA
Tomasz Placek (2011). Possibilities Without Possible Worlds/Histories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):737-765.
Nuel Belnap (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):593-625.

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