David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343 (2007)
Using empirical evidence to attack intuitions can be epistemically dangerous, because various of the complaints that one might raise against them (e.g., that they are fallible; that we possess no non-circular defense of their reliability) can be raised just as easily against perception itself. But the opponents of intuition wish to challenge intuitions without at the same time challenging the rest of our epistemic apparatus. How might this be done? Let us use the term “hopefulness” to refer to the extent to which we possess a good capacity for the detection and correction of the errors of any fallible source of evidence. I argue that we should not trust putative sources of evidence that are substantially lacking in hopefulness (even if they are basically reliable), and that we are indeed already operating under such a norm in our ordinary and scientific practices. I argue further that the philosophical practice of the appeal to intuitions is, in these terms, badly hopeless...
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Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Stich (2013). Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):151-178.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
Edouard Machery (2011). Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.
Ernest Sosa (2011). Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions? Mind and Language 26 (4):453-467.
Joshua Alexander (2010). Is Experimental Philosophy Philosophically Significant? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):377-389.
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