David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 117 (466):427-450 (2008)
I argued that Frege does not have a metatheory in the following sense: the justifications he offers for his basic laws and rules of inference neither employ nor require a truth-predicate or metalinguistic variables. In Does Frege Use a Truth-predicate in his "Justification" of the Laws of Logic?, Dirk Greimann disputes this. As Greimann interprets Frege, (i) Frege's remarks commit him to giving a metatheoretic justification of the basic laws and rules of his logic, and (ii) Frege actually gives such a justification in the early sections of Grundgesetze—although the truth-predicate that Frege employs is a non-standard one: it is neither a predicate that holds of all and only true sentences nor a predicate that holds of all and only true thoughts. I argue that Greimann's interpretation is not, in the end, true to the text, and that his non-standard view of what is required of a Tarskian truth-predicate is ultimately not viable. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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Günther Eder (forthcoming). Frege’s ‘On the Foundations of Geometry’ and Axiomatic Metatheory. Mind:fzv101.
George Duke & Peter Woelert (2015). Husserl and the Problem of Abstract Objects. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
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