Innateness as closed process invariance

Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323–344 (2006)
Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness
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DOI 10.1086/515414
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Ron Mallon (2010). Sources of Racialism. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (3):272-292.
Ron Mallon (2013). Was Race Thinking Invented in the Modern West? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):77-88.

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