Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3 - 18 (2008)
|Abstract||Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon’s and Woodward’s direct, narrow person-affecting solutions, and in favor of a new solution to the NIP. My solution, or, rather, dissolution, is based on the argument that merely possible people, i.e., hypothetical people who could possibly, but will not actually, exist, are morally irrelevant. I show that the NIP only arises when we concern ourselves with merely possible people. Once we are careful to restrict our concerns to only those that do or will exist, the NIP is dissolved.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Bernardo J. Cantens (2001). A Solution to the Problem of Personal Identity in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:121-134.
Anthony Wrigley (2012). Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.
Eduardo Rivera-lópez (2009). Individual Procreative Responsibility and the Non-Identity Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):336-363.
Ori J. Herstein (2009). The Identity and (Legal) Rights of Future Generations. The George Washington Law Review 77:1173.
Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating? Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
Mark Greene (2009). Choosing Future People: Reproductive Technologies and Identity. In Vardit Ravitsky, Autumn Fiester & Arthur L. Caplan (eds.), The Penn Center Guide to Bioethics. Springer Publishing Company.
Richard Greene (2004). Does the Non-Identity Problem Block a Class of Arguments Against Cloning? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1):95-101.
Russell Disilvestro (2009). Reproductive Autonomy, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Non-Person Problem. Bioethics 23 (1):59-67.
Guy Kahane (2009). Non-Identity, Self-Defeat, and Attitudes to Future Children. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193 - 214.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads71 ( #11,949 of 549,066 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,099 of 549,066 )
How can I increase my downloads?