Intuition & calibration

Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):15 (2012)
The practice of appealing to esoteric intuitions, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to this problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options are currently available, but leaves open the real possibility of such a calibration in the future.
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Jeffrey Maynes (2012). Linguistic Intuition and Calibration. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (5):443-460.

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