Kripke's second paragraph of philosophical investigations 201

Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):172–178 (2007)
Abstract The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it fails; in part three I suggest why commentators might have been motivated to offer it; and in part four I claim that two commentators who have offered it also imply otherwise.
Keywords Wittgenstein  Saul Kripke  Peter Winch  Colin McGinn  David G Stern  John McDowell  Philosophical Investigations §201
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