David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):601 - 616 (2011)
In this paper I offer solutions to two problems which our moral practice engenders for expressivism, the meta-ethical doctrine according to which ethical statements aren't propositional, susceptible of truth and falsity, but, rather, express the speaker's non-cognitive attitudes. First, the expressivist must show that arguments which are valid when interpreted propositionally are valid when construed expressivistically, and vice versa. The second difficulty is the Frege-Geach problem. Moral arguments employ atomic sentences, negations, disjunctions, etc., and, by expressivist lights, the meaning of a moral sentence depends on the attitude that it expresses. Since one's attitude varies as one asserts a claim, or negates it, or cites it as a disjunct, etc., the meaning of the relevant phrase changes as well, so the argument equivocates. (Formal proofs are provided in appendices to the paper.)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1988). Attitudes and Contents. Ethics 98 (3):501-517.
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
M. H. Brighouse (1990). Blackburn's Projectivism — an Objection. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):225 - 233.
P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.
Mark Schroeder (2008). How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation. Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Tempered Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Max Kölbel (1997). Expressivism and the Syntactic Uniformity of Declarative Sentences. Critica 29 (87):3–51.
Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
Patricia Marino (2006). Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):517 - 533.
Jussi Suikkanen (2009). The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
Nicholas Unwin (2008). Divine Hoorays: Some Parallels Between Expressivism and Religious Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):659-684.
James Harold (2008). Can Expressivists Tell the Difference Between Beauty and Moral Goodness? American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):289-300.
Jeff Wisdom (2009). A Defense of Descriptive Moral Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):285-300.
Billy Dunaway (2010). Minimalist Semantics in Meta-Ethical Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):351 - 371.
Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
Added to index2011-07-12
Total downloads11 ( #146,848 of 1,140,319 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #140,127 of 1,140,319 )
How can I increase my downloads?