Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):415 – 424 (2008)
|Abstract||Griffiths and Machery contend that the concept of innateness should be dispensed with in the sciences. We contend that, once that concept is properly understood as what we have called 'closed process invariance', it is still of significant use in the sciences, especially cognitive science.|
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