Minimalism deflated: Independence without substance

Synthese 171 (3):521 - 529 (2009)
The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism.
Keywords Truth  Minimalism  Deflationism  Epistemic theory of truth
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    Bernhard Weiss (2007). Anti-Realist Truth and Anti-Realist Meaning. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):213 - 228.
    Bernhard Weiss (2002). Michael Dummett. Princeton University Press.

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