On doing better, experimental-style [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455 - 464 (2009)
Timothy Williamson devotes significant effort in his The Philosophy of Philosophy to arguing against skepticism about judgment. One might think that the recent “experimental philosophy” challenge to the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence is a possible target of those arguments. However, this is not so. The structure of that challenge is radically dissimilar from that of traditional skeptical arguments, and the aims of the challenge are entirely congruent with the spirit of methodological improvement that Williamson himself exemplifies in the Afterword of his book.
Keywords Skepticism  Judgment  Intuitions  Experimental philosophy  Philosophical methodology
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Baron (1994). Nonconsequentialist decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):1.
Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

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Jennifer Nado (2014). Philosophical Expertise. Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.
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