David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 68 (2):265 - 276 (2008)
Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Auf der Straße (2012). Simply Extended Mind. Philosophia 40 (3):449-458.
Sven Walter (2010). Cognitive Extension: The Parity Argument, Functionalism, and the Mark of the Cognitive. Synthese 177 (2):285-300.
Sven Walter (2014). Situated Cognition: A Field Guide to Some Open Conceptual and Ontological Issues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):241-263.
Itay Shani (2013). Making It Mental: In Search for the Golden Mean of the Extended Cognition Controversy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-26.
Jacqueline A. Sullivan (2010). Realization, Explanation and the Mind-Body Relation. Synthese 177 (2):151-164.
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