Graduate studies at Western
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):229-241 (2010)
|Abstract||I argue that a practice can only be taken to be one of apparent rule following if it contains a practice of policing moves within the practice. So the existence of an apparently rule-governed practice entails the existence of, what I call, a policing practice. I then argue that this entailment cannot be reconciled with a non-factualist construal of the policing practice. Thus non-factualism about the policing practice is false. Factualism about the policing practice entails realism about rules. So I conclude that we ought to be realists about rules. Finally I distinguish a position which I call ultra-realism about rules and note that this too is a casualty of the view developed here|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
P. Lamarque (2010). Wittgenstein, Literature, and the Idea of a Practice. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (4):375-388.
Warren Schmaus (1996). The Empirical Character of Methodological Rules. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):106.
Adam Cureton (2012). Solidarity and Social Moral Rules. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):691-706.
Roger Teichmann (2002). Explaining the Rules. Philosophy 77 (4):597-613.
Mark McCullagh (2002). Wittgenstein on Rules and Practices. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:83-100.
Jacob Paroush (1997). Order Relations Among Efficient Decision Rules. Theory and Decision 43 (3):209-218.
Julia Tanney (2009). Real Rules. Synthese 171 (3):499 - 507.
Added to index2010-07-27
Total downloads21 ( #65,479 of 739,189 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,189 )
How can I increase my downloads?