Graduate studies at Western
Mind and Language 19 (1):48-56 (2004)
|Abstract||Fodor offers a novel argument against Bare-bones Concept Pragmatism (BCP). He alleges that there are two circularities in BCP’s account of concept possession: a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to sort; and a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to draw inferences. We argue that neither of these circles is real.|
|Keywords||Concept Metaphysics Possession Pragmatism Sorting Fodor, J|
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