The argument from divine indifference

Analysis 72 (4):707-714 (2012)
Abstract
I argue that the rationale behind the fine-tuning argument for design is self-undermining, refuting the argument’s own premise that fine-tuning is to be expected given design. In (Weisberg 2010) I argued on informal grounds that this premise is unsupported. White (2011) countered that it can be derived from three plausible assumptions. But White’s third assumption is based on a fallacious rationale, and is even objectionable by the design theorist’s own lights. The argument that shows this, the argument from divine indifference, simultaneously exposes the fine-tuning argument’s self-undermining character. The same argument also answers Bradley’s (forthcoming) reply to my earlier objection.
Keywords Fine-Tuning  Cosmology  God  Probability
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Neil A. Manson (2009). The Fine-Tuning Argument. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):271-286.
Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
Jonathan Weisberg (2005). Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):809-821.
M. C. Bradley (2001). The Fine-Tuning Argument. Religious Studies 37 (4):451-466.
Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
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