The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay

History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):21-40 (2008)
Abstract
Locke has been accused of failing to have a coherent understanding of consciousness, since it can be identical neither to reflection nor to ordinary perception without contradicting other important commitments. I argue that the account of consciousness is coherent once we see that, for Locke, perceptions of ideas are complex mental acts and that consciousness can be seen as a special kind of self-referential mental state internal to any perception of an idea.
Keywords John Locke  consciousness  reflection
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PhilPapers Archive Shelley Weinberg, The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay
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Galen Strawson (2013). Self-Intimation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-31.
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