David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):147 – 156 (1995)
Abstract The Duhem?Quine thesis is generally presented as the radical underdetermi? nation of a theory by experimental evidence. But there is a much?neglected second aspect, i.e. the coherence or interrelatedness of the conceptual components of a theory. Although both Duhem and Quine recognised this aspect, they failed to see its consequences: it militates against the idea of radical underdetermination. Because scientific theories are coherent conceptual systems, empirical evidence penetrates, as it were, the periphery and allows the localisation of central, not just peripheral hypotheses. There is then no reason to deny the existence of crucial experiments. Both these ideas are denied in the Quine?Duhem thesis. A discussion of the famous Stem?Gerlach experiment and the role of fundamental physical constants shows, however, that localisation is not only possible but essential for the validity of scientific theories. Quine's famous ?latitude of choice? turns out to be severely restricted
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
F. Weinert (1999). Theories, Models and Constraints. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (2):303-333.
Similar books and articles
Rogério Passos Severo (2008). “Plausible Insofar as It is Intelligible”: Quine on Underdetermination. Synthese 161 (1):141 - 165.
John D. Greenwood (1990). Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The "Theory-Informity" of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):553-574.
Wolfgang Pietsch (2012). Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference. In. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. 303--313.
Gary Wedeking (1969). Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification. Philosophy of Science 36 (4):375-380.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
Robert Klee (1992). In Defense of the Quine-Duhem Thesis: A Reply to Greenwood. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):487-491.
Morten Søberg (2005). The Duhem‐Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics: A Reinterpretation. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):581-597.
Added to index2009-02-01
Total downloads19 ( #88,174 of 1,100,727 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #176,272 of 1,100,727 )
How can I increase my downloads?