David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Chapter I: Testimony: The Problem word, pdf) Chapter I defines the framework for the discussion of the epistemology of testimony. Testimony is defined, strictly, as utterances that are meant to be believed on the teller’s say-so alone, not because of supporting arguments or any like considerations. A working analysis of this notion of testimony is given, based on Grice’s analysis of “non-natural meaning” in terms of the speaker’s intention to induce belief by means of the hearer’s recognition of that intention (Grice 1957). This analysis of testimony permits us to frame the problem of the epistemology of testimony, how testimony can justify us in believing what we are told.
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