David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):87-105 (2004)
models of cognition are essentially incomplete because they fail to capture the temporal properties of mental processing. I present two possible interpretations of the dynamicists' argument from time and show that neither one is successful. The disagreement between dynamicists and symbolic theorists rests not on temporal considerations per se, but on differences over the multiple realizability of cognitive states and the proper explanatory goals of psychology. The negative arguments of dynamicists against symbolic models fail, and it is doubtful whether pursuing dynamicists' explanatory goals will lead to a robust psychological theory. Introduction Elements of the symbolic theory Elements of dynamical systems theory The argument from time 4.1 First interpretation of the argument from time 4.2 Second interpretation of the argument from time Limits of dynamical systems theory
|Keywords||Cognition Dynamic Model Psychology Science System Time|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Heather Dyke (2002). Mc Taggart and the Truth About Time. In Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge University Press. 137-.
L. Nathan Oaklander & V. Alan White (2007). B-Time: A Reply to Tallant. Analysis 67 (4):332–340.
Scott Hotton & Jeff Yoshimi (2011). Extending Dynamical Systems Theory to Model Embodied Cognition. Cognitive Science 35 (3):444-479.
Teresa McCormack & Christoph Hoerl (2008). Temporal Decentering and the Development of Temporal Concepts. In P. Indefrey & M. Gullberg (eds.), Time to Speak. Cognitive and Neural Prerequisites of Time in Language. Blackwell.
Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.) (2001). Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
James W. Garson (1996). Cognition Poised at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Alternative to a Symbolic Mind. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):301-22.
Joseph Glicksohn (2001). Temporal Cognition and the Phenomenology of Time: A Multiplicative Function for Apparent Duration. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):1-25.
Vyvyan Evans (2004). The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Iris van Rooij (2012). Self-Organization Takes Time Too. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):63-71.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #49,053 of 1,088,832 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,832 )
How can I increase my downloads?