Understanding is not simulating: a reply to Gibbs and Perlman

In this response, I do four things. First, I defend the claim that the action compatibility effect does not distinguish between embodied and traditional accounts of language comprehension. Second, I present neuroimaging and neuropsychological results that seem to support the traditional account. Third, I argue that metaphorical language poses no special challenge to the arguments I gave against embodied theories of comprehension. Fourth, I lay out the architecture of language I advocate and suggest the sorts of data that would decide between traditional and embodied accounts.Keywords: Language; Comprehension; Perception; Action; Embodied cognition; Representation.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.002
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Daniel A. Weiskopf (2007). Concept Empiricism and the Vehicles of Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):156-183.

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