What Descartes' Demon Can Do and his Dream Cannot

Theoria 72 (4):319-335 (2006)
The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes’ scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducing.
Keywords Descartes  demon argument  dream argument  scepticism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2006.tb00968.x
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