Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120 (1999)
I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism
Keywords Epiphenomenalism  Epistemology  Monism  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00075
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