Frege on Indirect Proof

History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290 (2011)
Abstract
Frege's account of indirect proof has been thought to be problematic. This thought seems to rest on the supposition that some notion of logical consequence ? which Frege did not have ? is indispensable for a satisfactory account of indirect proof. It is not so. Frege's account is no less workable than the account predominant today. Indeed, Frege's account may be best understood as a restatement of the latter, although from a higher order point of view. I argue that this ascent is motivated by Frege's conception of logic
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    References found in this work BETA
    Gottlob Frege (1964). The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Berkeley, University of California Press.
    Richard Heck (1997). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §§29‒32. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (3):437-474.

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