David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290 (2011)
Frege's account of indirect proof has been thought to be problematic. This thought seems to rest on the supposition that some notion of logical consequence ? which Frege did not have ? is indispensable for a satisfactory account of indirect proof. It is not so. Frege's account is no less workable than the account predominant today. Indeed, Frege's account may be best understood as a restatement of the latter, although from a higher order point of view. I argue that this ascent is motivated by Frege's conception of logic
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred Tarski (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Warren D. Goldfarb (1979). Logic in the Twenties: The Nature of the Quantifier. Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (3):351-368.
Gottlob Frege (1964). The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Thomas Ricketts (1997). Frege's 1906 Foray Into Metalogic. Philosophical Topics 25 (2):169-188.
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