David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290 (2011)
Frege's account of indirect proof has been thought to be problematic. This thought seems to rest on the supposition that some notion of logical consequence ? which Frege did not have ? is indispensable for a satisfactory account of indirect proof. It is not so. Frege's account is no less workable than the account predominant today. Indeed, Frege's account may be best understood as a restatement of the latter, although from a higher order point of view. I argue that this ascent is motivated by Frege's conception of logic
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred Tarski (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Gottlob Frege (1964). The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Warren D. Goldfarb (1979). Logic in the Twenties: The Nature of the Quantifier. Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (3):351-368.
Thomas Ricketts (1997). Frege's 1906 Foray Into Metalogic. Philosophical Topics 25 (2):169-188.
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