Kann es ein argument für den skeptizismus geben? Das epistemische problem der irrtumsmöglichkeit

Is there any argument for scepticism? The epistemic problem of the possibility of error. Arguments for scepticism rest on the assumption that knowledge claims are fallible. For this reason the concept of knowledge appears to be questionable. Since it is necessary to distinguish doubts from possible doubts, the arguments for scepticism appear to be unconvincing. If we take it into account that we know something that is immune to doubt, we should draw the conclusion that, contrary to scepticism, knowledge claims have to be compatible with being fallible. Thus any knowledge claim is capable of being doubted
Keywords Außenwelt  Fallibilität  Gewissheit  Infallibilität  Meinung  Traum  Traumargument  Wachzustand  Wissen  Zweifel  Zweifelsmöglichkeit
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