Referential inscrutability: Coming to terms without it
Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):263-273 (1984)
| Abstract | According to Quine, terms of divided reference like 'rabbit' have two sorts of problems: problems of direct and deferred ostension. Hence the reference of these terms is inscrutable. This article holds that the problems of deferred ostension can be handled by Goodman's theory of projection, and that the problems of direct ostension turn out to be pedestrian problems of signs. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Mohan Matthen (1984). Ostension, Names and Natural Kind Terms. Dialogue 23 (01):44-58.
J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Permutations and Foster Problems: Two Puzzles or One? Ratio 21 (1):91–105.
Ari Maunu (2002). Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent. Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.
B. Schnieder (2007). The Importance of 'Being Earnest'. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):40 - 55.
Emilio Ribes-Iñesta (2004). Behavior Is Abstraction, Not Ostension: Conceptual and Historical Remarks on the Nature of Psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):55 - 68.
Peter K. Unger (1984/2002). Philosophical Relativity. Oxford University Press.
Alberto Voltolini (2004). Can There Be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference? Erkenntnis 61 (1):75-98.
Austen Clark (2006). Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127:167-193.
Martine Nida-Rümelin (1993). Probability and Direct Reference. Erkenntnis 39 (1):51-78.
Kent Bach (1987). Thought and Reference. Oxford University Press.
Virgil Aldrich (1977). Description and Expression: Physicalism Restricted. Inquiry 20 (1-4):149 – 164.
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2010-09-15Total downloads1 ( #275,053 of 549,695 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,695 )How can I increase my downloads? |

