David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):839 - 862 (2013)
An argument is developed for the conclusion that certain neurological conditions and disorders are directly relevant for understanding the self?'s embodiment and the ownership of conscious experience enjoyed by such an embodied self. Since these neurological conditions and disorders provide evidence that there can be shifts of, and compromises to, ownership, they help identify neural substrates and realizers of such ownership. However, even if recent neuroimaging and neuropsychological nominees for neural substrates of ownership unity are core realizers of ownership, they are not its total realizers. Implications of the distinction between core and total realizers are discussed
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References found in this work BETA
Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Anthony Chemero (2011). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. A Bradford Book.
Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Lukasz A. Kurowski (2014). Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance: A Response to Rex Welshon’s “Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity”. Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):123-132.
Rex Welshon (2015). Reply to Lukasz Kurowski’s “Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance”. Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):133-137.
Cees van Leeuwen (2015). What Makes You Think You Are Conscious? An Agnosticist Manifesto. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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