David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Critical Horizons 4 (1):29-54 (2003)
This paper argues that the concept of truth cannot be explained with the help of the idea of justification under ideal conditions. Truth is not a regulative idea. The attempt to replace a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth with one that is conceptually epistemic does not provide an exit from metaphysics. Truth and its justification do not coincide with reference to the ascription of judgements and beliefs. To save the normative power of truth no Archemedean point is needed.
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Roberto Frega (2013). Rehabilitating Warranted Assertibility: Moral Inquiry and the Pragmatic Basis of Objectivity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):1-23.
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