A propositional logic with relative identity connective and a partial solution to the paradox of analysis

Studia Logica 85 (2):251 - 260 (2007)
We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis.
Keywords Philosophy   Computational Linguistics   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Logic
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DOI 10.2307/40210769
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References found in this work BETA
Roman Suszko (1968). Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9 (1):7-33.
George Bealer & Uwe Mönnich (1989). Property Theories. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Kluwer 133--251.
Roman Suszko (1975). Abolition of the Fregean Axiom. Lecture Notes in Mathematics 453:169-239.

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