Asking for Reasons as a Weapon: Epistemic Justification and the Loss of Knowledge

Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):173-190 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I will look at what role being able to provide justification plays in several prominent conceptions of epistemology, and argue that taking the ability to provide reasons as necessary for knowledge leads to a biasing toward false negatives. However, I will also argue that asking for reasons is a common practice among the general public, and one that is endorsed by “folk epistemology.” I will then discuss the fact that this asking for reasons is done neither constantly nor arbitrarily, but rather in a systematic way that produces ignorance by oppressing some knowledge and some knowers, in particular those from already marginalized groups. After looking at the implications of all this, I will ultimately argue that we must be very careful when we ask for reasons, and acknowledge it as the powerful weapon it is.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-05-15

Downloads
536 (#32,633)

6 months
64 (#67,366)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ian Werkheiser
University Of Texas Rio Grande VAlley

Citations of this work

Injustice in the Spaces between Concepts.Fran Fairbairn - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):102-136.
Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation.Asia Ferrin - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):68-95.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

View all 18 references / Add more references