Descartes discarded? Introspective self-awareness and the problems of transparency and compositionality☆
Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):751-761 (2010)
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Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
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