David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In A. Kanamori (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Document Center. 67-88 (2000)
Resolution of Frege's Puzzle by denying that synonym substitution in logical truths preserves sentence sense and explaining how logical form has semantic import. Intensional context substitutions needn't preserve truth, because intercepting doesn't preserve sentence meaning. Intercepting is nonuniformly substituting a pivotal term in syntactically secured truth. Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are Greeks; gg: Greece is Greece) and their synonym interceptions (GH: Greeks are Hellenes; gh: Greece is Hellas) share factual content (extrasentential reality asserted). Semantic (cognitive) content is (identifiable with) factual content in synthetic predications, but not logical sentences and interceptions. Putnam's Postulate (Logical form has semantic import) entails interception nonsynonymy. Syntax and vocabulary explain only the factual content of synthetic predications; extrasentential reality explains their truth. Construction of logical factual content explains logical necessity. Terms retain objectual reference, but logical syntax preempts their function (and thereby function of extrasentential reality) in explaining truth. Grasping the facts GG/gg assert entails understanding this. Understanding what GH states requires some recognition that GH must be true just because GmH ("Greeks" means Hellenes), and GmH ("Greeks" means what "Hellenes" means) state an empirical fact. GH (but not GG) is standardly used to express that fact. Church's <span class='Hi'>Test</span> exposes puzzles. QMi sentences ("Ex" means Ex), and QTi sentences (p≡it is true p≡"p" is true) are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Intercepting QMi creates empirical QM contingencies ("Ex" means Ey). Synonymy turns semantic contingencies (GmH/GmH) into metalogical (GmG/GmG) and lexical (GH) necessities. That transformation is syntactic, via the syntactic duality of definite descriptions. GmH is a contingent copredication, and a lexically necessary referential identity with rigidly codesignating indexicals. Metalogical sentences may be about expressional matter or what it expresses (meaning, proposition). GG (Griechen sind Griechen) has GG's semantic content, but the referent expression switches. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing. Metalogically, referents are identified with intrasentential replica. Extrasentential identifications are metalogically irrelevant
|Keywords||Frege's Puzzle Synonymy Logical form Curch's Translation Test|
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