Voluntary Consent: Why a Value-Neutral Concept Won't Work

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (3):226-254 (2012)
Abstract
Some maintain that voluntariness is a value-neutral concept. On that view, someone acts involuntarily if subject to a controlling influence or has no acceptable alternatives. I argue that a value-neutral conception of voluntariness cannot explain when and why consent is invalid and that we need a moralized account of voluntariness. On that view, most concerns about the voluntariness of consent to participate in research are not well founded
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    N. Stoljar (2011). Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (4):375-384.
    Gopal Sreenivasan (2007). Does Informed Consent to Research Require Comprehension? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:85-93.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-05-03

    Total downloads

    16 ( #85,963 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.